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νANGELIS D. PROTOP ΑΡADAΚIS
ΤΗΕ MAINFRAME OF ΑΝ ADEQUATE
AND EFFECTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS
During the last two centuries, occidenta1 philosophical meditation
has triumphantly adνanced through preνiously poorly charted fields.
Science has real10cated the methods as wel1 as the goals of philoso-
phy, forcing scholars to adνance a little further, embrace new cogni-
tiνe chal1enges and οοττοεροαο to new social needs. As a result, our
eνeryday life has become easier and ουι world is a better place to liνe
ία. But still, an optimum situation is not achieνed. As a matter of fact,
there are more things at stake ίη our era than there were in preνious
ones. Even basic prerequisites for a prosperous life are not fully met.
For the first time in the history of mankind, we can not eνen be sure
about the surνiνal of ουι planet, not to mention well being οί it's liνing
entities -man included. So far, where ίε the improνement? .Ουτ ances-
tors may not haνe had the luxury of fast transportation, immediate
information οι adequate medical treatment, still they could take some
things for granted: they positively knew that they and their successors
would be giνen the minimum of chances: they, at least, would haνe a
place to liνe.
Π that is the case, what went wrong? Obνiously, somebody has not
done his part. Wheneνer problems appear, specific scientists are
entitled to deal with them and solνe them. Science is adνancing due
to and in accordance with practical difficulties. If enνironment is
endangered, there is a specific scientific cast to blame. Might they be
the enνironmentalists? Defmitely τιοτ, Enνiromenta1ists inform us οτι
how an ecosystem works, and which should our actions be ίη order Ιο
rescue οι to improνe its functions. They can ιιοι force us to act in
faνour - or, to the detriment - of it. They can not ίωρΙΥ what is the
right thing to do and what should we abstain of. That ίδ an ethica1
philosopher's duty. Are there the ethicists Ιο blame? Ifyes, what for?
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One might notice that Ecoethics now days are advancing, ethical com-
mittees are being world wide formed, green policies are being
adopted. ΑΠ these happen due to environmentaI ethicists' efforts. It
appears to be ιιο ground for blame.
It would be meaningless to argue that ethics aηd, Ια particular, its
most specialized branch, Ecoethics, detήmeηt the eηvironmental
case. Πnot the better aπaηgemeηts still achieved, it is not due to bad
ίατετιιίοτιε or inadequacy, but mostly due to the complexity of the
issue aηd its interconnectioηs with Ιιιιπιετι activities. Ευνίτουωευτ is
not aη isolated issue like, for example, euthanasia, which philosophers
can easily focus οα aηd attempt to provide their proposals. Εενίτοτι-
ment is everywhere. Απ ethicist οειι not deal with ίι ία vacuum, as if ίι
was some kiηd of mind game οτ an intellectual challenge. When it
comes to environmental issues, the situation becomes urgent and
pressing, yet it requires caution aηd dedication of the highest degree.
Ροτ, wheη a particular issue is settled, a braηd ηew οτιο, internally
associated with the former, arises. Due to that, in my belief, it is ne-
cessary for someone willing to deal with environmental ethics to be
specific, precise and always focused. Maybe ίι was the lack of the
above mentioned attributes that has caused delay and coηfusion to
the environmeηtal issue.
Nowadays, he who deals with environmental issues will probably
get Ιοει aηd fiηd himself driven to uηfamiliar teπaίn, such as ontolo-
gy οτ religion. Ιε the man superior to other living species? Can we
attήbute ethical merit to nοn living matter? Are we eηtitled by the
Creator with stewardship over the world? Ιε ίι probable that animals
share an immortal sou1? May intrinsic value be attached to sentience
alone, or sentiments count morally as well? Ιε ίτ sound to argue that
the whole has ethical priority to the individual, οτ could that lead us
to a slippery slope situation, misleading ιιε to ethical appreciation οί
fascisms οί any kind? All these questions are familiar to anyone who
is - even superficially - engaged to environmental ethics. They con-
stitute important - as well as misleading - matters. For when the
questions are provocative and ample, it is easy for εοπιεοτιε to get
driven away οί the pήmary goal.
Eηviroηmental ethics' Ρήmary goal should aηd could only be the
284 VANGEl1S D. PROTOPAPADAKIS
survival and floUΉshing οί life οτι earth as we know ίι.' It would be
useless and detrimental, as well, to charge enνironmental ethics with
duties that belong to a broader field οί meditation. If the goal is the
above mentioned, the οηlΥthing missing is the means to the end. The
only way οί achieving the pre-mentioned aim is to form an adequate
ethical structure to sustain the preservation οί the enνironment. Α
structure to be adequate, Ιιhas to be solid and broadly applicable. If
not, it will fall apart like a castle built ου sand, leaving environment
and its inhabitants pray to a society which entirely lacks ethical com-
pass. For an ethics to be solid and broadly applicable it takes to be
clear, inductive, stable, ρτεεοτίριίνε and, in υο case, contradictive.
That is because ethics are to be adopted by the majοήty οί people to
be effective, and such a majοήty hardly never is moderately informed
οτι ethical matters. An ethics to be inductive means that one step has
to be followed by another, pacing slowly from simple to more complex
issues, always keeping in mind aim and pήnciple. ΤΟ be presCΉptive,
an environmental ethics has to attήbute intήnsic value to the environ-
ment and its components, that means lifeless matter, υοιι sentient life,
sentient τιοιι human life and, finally, humans. If not successful in this
effort, conclusions may be paradoxical. For instance, ίτ may be argued
that one ought to respect sentient τιοιι human life, but has υο prima
facie duty to protect the life sustaining ecosystems.2 It ίε the same as
to insist that we are ethically obliged to respect and protect someone,
but we are permitted to destroy his residence endangering his future
existence.3 Furthermore, the ίαιτίυείο value οί each component should
not exceed the value οί every other. Equality ία the possession οί
value is the οηlΥway to avoid further complications. Ιί not, we may be
forced to reach the conclusion that some beings are ethically prior to
others, which ίε an untoward as well as an inconvenient one. That is
because we should entitle some one to judge the amount οί ethica1
value that beings possess and to form an ερρτορτίετο ethical hierar-
chy. However, who would be οί such ethical πιετίτ and skill to fit to
that role? Further more, ίί we adopt a hierarchy οί πιετίι, we may be
1. Leopold Α.,Α Sαnd COltnty Almαnαc, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1949.
2. Stone C., SllOllld Trees Have Stαnding?, Los Angeles: Kaufrnann, 1974.
3. Protopapadakis Ε. D., Ecoethics, Athens: Sakkoulas, 2005:32-40.
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involved in a slippery slope situation. We could easily accept an ethi-
cal priority of wholes to single individuals, which ίδ an ethically per-
ilous acceptance, dynamically leading to misanthropy and different
k:inds of fascism.4 Therefore, an environmental ethics should be an
egalitarian one when it comes to value possession and Ρrίοήty affairs.
Υet, as perilous as the task might be, the need for attήbuting intrinsic
value το the environment remains. Ροι that kind of va1ue is most pre-
scήΡtίve and stable over time. Recognition of intήnsίc value creates a
ρτίαιε facie direct moral duty οτι behalf of moral agents to respect and
revere the carrier or the possessor of that value.5
One might argue that attributing intrinsic value το nature is not the
only way to reach an ethical structure capable of sustaining the pre-
servation of the environment. We could, as well, focus οτι the instru-
mental values that environment holds. As a matter of fact, we could
much easier, that way, derive ethical imperatives acceptable by the
majority of mankind.6 Νο one could ever deny that the preservation of
flora and fauna is essentia1 to humans because they provide ιιε
aesthetic pleasure and supply us with oxygen. Such a view - usually
referred Ιο as anthropocentric - focuses ου human interests in the
preservation of the environment. Νοιι human objects do ιιοτ posses
some kind of value as such, but because they are means Ιο valued
ends: the human wel1being. That way it would be self evident that
people do have an ethical duty to care for and protect the environ-
ment, as their care is not really focused οα environment but, in fact,
takes into consideration only their own and other people welfare.
Such an ethics would be clear and solid enough, hence most effective.
Nevertheless, ίι would be ιιοι at all stable over time. It is evident, for
example, that a forest possesses instrumental value, as the major pro-
vider of oxygen, which is essential to human life. However, as technolo-
gy advances, ίτ ίδ very possible that oxygen may be mechanically pro-
duced in the future. Which one will be the instrumenta1 value of forests
then? None, since their existence would not any more be valuable to
4. Callicott J. Β., In Defense ofthe Land Ethic: Essays in EnVΊronmεntaZ PhiZosophy, A1bany:
SUNY Press, 1989.
5. Nress Α., "The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement" in Deep Ecology
for the 21st CentllIY, G. Sessions (ed.), Boston: Shambhala, 1995.
6. Frankena W., SocialJustice, Spectrum Books, 1962:19.
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mankind. Οτι the contrary, deforestation would have much more ethi-
cal merit, since ίι would provide housing to the homeless and vast
areas for agricultural purposes. One might insist οιι the aesthetic
value of the forests, which, as well, ίε an instrumental va1ue. But the
wilderness ίε accessible to few people nowadays, hence an aristocrat-
ic form of rejoice.7 Οιι the other hand, virtual rea1ity could provide us
the means of wide spread rejoice, accessible by anyone. Or, there
could be artificial fauna created for aesthetical admiration. If a rare
species of butterfly has οηlΥ aesthetic va1ue, what keeps as of out-
ηumbeήηg ίι ίη order to make it accessible by people ίτι much visited
museums οτ putting ίι οιι stamps? It is evident that such an anthro-
pocentric view faces the environment as a mechanica1 producer οτ as
a state of art but, clearly, the environment ίε not on1y that. Further-
more, philosophy should deal with reality as well as with probability,
as far as the probability ίε not antithetic to logic. Ethics, as well, when
ίτι the state of formation, should be greatly considerate about slippery
slope situations. That means, al1possible consequences - positive as
well as negative ones - should be taken into consideration, otherwise
moral agents may be involved in untoward situations. If nature is οοη-
sidered as a mere supplier, τιο means would be able to prevent an eco-
logical catastrophe ίτι τιο longer obviously beneficia1. Finally, an ethics
which is based οιι opportunity and chance ίε not a stable one at all.
Thus, an environmental ethics to be stable is to be τιοιι anthropocen-
tric.
The next step to an ethics stable over time is to render it self stan-
ding and independent from other sciences. That means that it should
be not approached ίη consequentialistic terms. Consequentialism
attaches ίοττίιιείο value to the aftermath of an ethical choice. The ρτί-
mary goal is to achieve the optimum balance of pleasure over pain for
the maximum number of individua1s. Especially essential to conse-
qualistic analysis is the capability of feeling pain and pleasure.8 The
former ίε intήnsically disvalued, while the later is considered to carry
7. Stretton Η., Cαpitαlίsm, Socίαlίsm αnd the environment, Cambήdge: Cambridge University
Press, 1976:211.
8. Bentham J., Int1"Od~lctionto tlrePΙincίples ο! Morαls αnd Legίslαtίon, cp. XVΠ, Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1948.
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ίαιτίυείο value. Therefore, one should abstain from acts that produce
pain, unless they are inevitable -that means they produce greater
pleasure than pain to the greater number of beings. Thus, humans
should abstain from eating meat, as the pain inflicted to animals could
be easily avoided with ιιο essential cost to mankind.9 That is because
the amount of protein gained from animal flesh can be adequately
substituted by vegetable protein. But that way, ethics trespass biology
and dietology teuain. As far as dietology indicates that vegetable pro-
tein is equivalent to meat protein ία τιιιιτίοτιτ value, the case ίε ethi-
cally stable. Ethics is not self standing anymore, though. As dietology
advances, Ιτ may be manifested that meat protein is essential to Ιιιι-
man τιιιττίιίοη, not exchangeable to vegetable οτιο." Ιτι that case, the
consequentialistic argument τιο loner stands. One should say that
ethics should be informed by reality, so there is nothing wrong ία ta-
king into consideration other sciences' conclusions. Well, information
is quite different to formation. Ethics should be informed but not
formed by actual facts. Ethics should form reality, not the other way.
Το render the argument clearer, we could use a more complex exam-
ple. The hunting of whales, analysed οτι an utilitarian basis, is ethical-
ly disapproved since ίι inflicts pain to those - close kin- animals with-
out producing any benefits which could not substituted by other
means. Ια grassroots terms whale hunting produces more pain than
pleasure, therefore ίτ possesses ethical disvalue. However, a whole
culture may be based ου whale huηting. Small societies residiηg ίη
specific places, an ethical system adopted by people, a way of life, a
specific sentimental state, these are side factors which should be taken
ίτιιο consideration before a conclusion οα the value of the specific
practice is reached. As apparent, the case iηvolves psychology, εοοίο-
logy, applied economics, ethics and social sciences as well. Por exam-
ple, psychology may coηclude that those people occupied ίτι whale
hunting could not alter their way of life. Economics could indicate
that the cessation of the practise would be detrimental to the Norwe-
gian economy as a whole. Ιτι that case, the ethical assessmeηt ofwhale
9. Singer Ρ., 'ΆΙΙ animals are equal" ίn Applied Ethics, Ρ. Singer (ed.), Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1986:221-222.
10. Lappe F. Μ.,Diet for α smαll plαnet, New γ ork: Ballantine, 1971:4-11.
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hunting as a practice bearing ethical disvalue would not any longer
stand. Being consequentialistic, ethics cede their domain to other sci-
ences. Not only that, ίτ also adopts the "is and ought" fallacy, infeπίng
an ought from fact. However, as mentioned above, ethics is intended
to form reality. If this wasn't true, humans should be permitted killing
each other according to their natural abilities, since ίι happens in
nature. Law, culture, obedience to rules and self commitment wou1d
be mere intellectual occupation with υο practica1 va1ue. Furthermore,
there had to be a scientific committee available whenever decisions
concerning environmental issues should be made. Βeaήng in mind
the need for stability, independency, efficiency and simplicity for an
ethics conceming the environment, we have to reject consequentia-
lism. Ιτι my belief, environmental ethics shou1d be a deontological
example.
Deontology applies intrinsic value not to the consequence of an
ethical decision, but to the rule according to which the decision ίε
formed. In philosophical terms we could call that an a ρτίοτί appro-
ach, while consequentialism uses an a ροετοιίοτί one. Deontology
holds some rules οί intrinsic value, with which the acts of moral agents
should comply. For instance, murder is always denounced, whether
produces benefits or not. Reverence for life is always a value pos-
sessor, whether the life οί the specific individual ίε good or evi1.These
are clear rules, easy for people to understand, stable over time, a1ready
proven sufficient ία forming an ethics which hitherto sustained οοοί-
dental civilization. The question is whether deontology is applicable
to environmental ethics or a paradigm shift should be needed. If deo-
ntology ίε such a sufficient approach, then why has it hitherto failed ίτι
forming an ethics capable of preventing the obvious and omnipresent
exploitation and destruction of the environment?
The problem lies ίτι distinguishing a ρτίοτί values in nature, such as
life, sentience, self identity, consciousness or εοιιί." Deontology, due
to ίιε inner structure, ίδ unable to function without attήbuting a ρτίοτί
values as such. That ίε because individuals or beings are not to be ethi-
cally respected as such, but only as possessors of specific values. As
11. Vlastos G., "Justice and Equality" in Equality: Selected Readings, L. Pojman & R. West-
moreland (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997:120-133.
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for people and higher animals, it is quite easy to establish an appro-
priate reverence of their existence, ίοι they possess the majority of the
pre mentioned attributes. However, when it comes to rocks οτ brooks,
insects or serpents, viruses οτ bacteria and, most of all, ecosystems, ίτ
is very difficult to deontology to stand its grounds. For ίτ would be
preposterous to attribute life or sentience to rocks, self identity to
viruses, soul to ecosystems and consciousness to termites. Every effort
aiming to apply such attήbutes to non-sentient life is destined to end
υρ in bizaue argumentation. So, what will ίι be? Το use Bentham's
phraseology, should we leave τιου sentient natural existence without
redress to its possible tormentors? Ι suppose not even one of us
should like that.
The main principles of occidental ethical deontology are reverence
οί life, respect of ones autonomy and dignity, abstention of acts who
endanger other people's interests and well being. Any act complying
with these ΡήncίΡΙes ίε ethically valued, while al1opposite disvalued.
But what do we really mean when we state that someone οτ something
is alive? Of course that it exists,but not only that. For a rock exists as
well, but is not alive at all. Life is far more than that, it includes con-
science, self identity, sentience etc. Sometimes life is independent
from existence, since one can reasonably argue that a beloved person
who recently passed away lives in his memory or that Plato is alive
through his philosophy, though both obviously do not exist. But one
may be heavily insulted if another speaks ίΙι of his passed away
beloved person, meaning that ίι ίε life itself we revere and not exis-
tence. It would be life ίτι any form that has intrinsic value, whether
actual οι not, whether existing οι absent. Autonomy, οτι the other
hand, ίε intήnsίcaΙΙΥvalued ίη fact as well as an idea. One that argues
in favour of slavery is equally to blame as one who practices slavery.
Rules and pήnciples are not actual beings, just ideas; therefore they
are applicable to both ideas and existing entities. This reasoning
seems stable enough as far as it goes unchallenged. Ροι instance, do
we have to respect only livingbeings,whether they exist οτ not? When
it comes to a dead body, we only can admit that it just exists, but ίτ ίε
not alive.Υet principle indicates that ίι must be treated with respect.
As a matter of fact, people often consider it a major αίσιε to offend
a dead body than to mistreat a living person. If one hits another he is
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said to be quick tempered οτ lacking manners, but when a corpse ίε
being kicked we call the perpetrator malicious and evil. The same
applies to a person in permanent vegetative state. Though apparently
he lacks life, sentience, self identity, prospect οτ any other property
we usually attach to life, it is strictly prohibited to be treated ίυ a bad
way even in the absence of those who might be dissatisfied by such a
treatment. Ιιι these cases, it is mere existence that we are ethically
obliged to revere.
Life is just one form of existence. There are many forms of life, and
much more ways of existing. Α living person is the possessor of both
life and existence, and we ought to respect him. Α dead person is only
existing, but we ought to show him due respect as well. In fact, we can
face life only as a subset of the total, which is existence. Further more,
when we talk about dignity οτ autonomy, we are obviously referring to
a form of existence. People fight and die for such ideas, so they obvious-
ly exist for they have the power to in:fluence and manipulate. The
same applies to sentience οτ self consciousness. They are not ways of
living but ways of existing. Α person who lacks self consciousness is
alive as one who does not, but they exist Ίη different ways. It is that
fact, that they exist, that we have the duty to respect. If it is existence
in some of its forms that we respect, then it should be proven why we
shouldn't we do the same ίτι all other ones. Why should we respect a
dead body but not a valley οτ a ιιοτι sentient organism? One might
argue that ίτ is justified οιι account of each ones past history. Α dead
person has a personal history while a forest has not. Yet, a dead per-
son is to be transformed into a valley, and, anyway, in his present situ-
ation he exists the same way as any natural being does, being used by
nature for τιιιιτίιίοα purposes as any decaying debήs is. Further more,
if what we call personal history is just a succession of acts and achieve-
ments, Ι suppose that even a termite could be recognized some. Ιε ίι
because he formerly was the possessor of an immortal soul? One who
argues that way is about to embrace theology, therefore he is not
reasoning in safe ethical grounds. Many religions hold that natural
beings posses an immortal soul but that, as well, is not philosophy. We
are in need to prove οτι a philosophical basis that a human corpse dif-
fers essentially from a tree trunk in the way they both exist. Ι think
that nothing can be even slightly convincing οτι that. One might also
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argue that respect of a being iS due to his human nature. That means
we have the duty to respect existence only ία its human form. That
argument as well can not stand the challenge. Why only ίη its human
form? Is it because of life? Life is proven to be an weak excuse. Is it
due to sentience? Sentience has been proven likewise. Ι8 it becau8e of
its formation? But then we would have υο moral duties to deformed
war victims, whether living οτ not. Is it because of the immortal soul?
Even if we accept the hazard of trespassing theology's terrain, we
would be embarrassed by the vulgarity of the argument: we ought to
revere a person due to something we have never seen, having proper-
ties which we arbίtraήΙΥ recognize and which once were, but are not
anymore. Frankly, Ιwould be very thankful to be shown a reason why
we should count human existence ίη al1 ίιε forms differently to every
other natural existence. Humans are just a noble contribution to the
variety of existence οιι earth.
Therefore, when we argue ου moral agents' duty to respect life, ίη
fact we are referήng to the ethica1 merit of existence. Using that term
we could only be referring to existence ίη every form, from sentient to
insentient life, from organic nature to lifeless matter. Reverence for
existence ίη ίιε every form is a safe ground for the foundation of
environmental ethics. Ιτι my ορίαίοτι, ιιο. peculiar reasoning or paradigm
shift is needed in order to achieve an ethics capable of sustaining
preservation of integrity,stability and beauty of the environment. We
could just be driven to an adequate ethics by analyticity, reasoning ίτι
an inductive and stable way. Ια any case, we shall keep ία mind the
principal purpose: the formation of ethics comprehensive, stable,
solid, prescriptive enough, far from unnecessary novelty οτ unwanted
revolutionary tendencies, one which could easi1y be adopted by
mankind and which could lead to the reverence of the environment
and the preservation of biodiversity οα earth. Ιυ my ορίυίοα, such an
ethics could be based ου the deontological principle of reverence for
existence, which appears to be a powerful ethical imperative.
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